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Collective And Individual Rationality: Robert  Malthus’s Heterodox Theodicy1 
 
Andy Denis 






In previous research, investigating economists’ conceptions of the relationship be- tween micro-level self-seeking 
behaviour and the desirability of macro-level out- comes, I identiﬁed two rhetorical strategies of laissez-faire, 
characterised by reductionism, and by holism plus an invisible-hand mechanism. The paper suggests that Malthus 
switches from the latter to the former. Opposing literary Jacobins by means of the principle of population, he is 
drawn far from Smith’s providentialism. In 1798 he presents a novel theodicy to reconcile his theory with 
providentialism, but by 1803 abandons this in favour of a reductionist argument that unaided individual self- interest 




This paper forms part of a research project investigating conceptions of the relationship between micro-level self-
seeking agent behaviour (individual rationality), on the one hand, and the desirability or otherwise of the resulting 
macro-level social outcomes (collective rationality), on the other, in the history of economic thought. I have 
previously (Denis 2004) identiﬁed two “rhetorical strategies of laissez-faire”, a strategy based in a reductionist 
ontology, and one based in a more holistic view of the world. By reductionism I mean a standpoint according to 
which the whole is just the sum of the parts, and by holism, the opposite, the view that the whole is not merely the 
sum of the parts but is emergent (Denis 2004, 342-343). 
 
Reductionist laissez-faire writers such as Friedman and Lucas argue that important aspects of the society we live in 
can straightforwardly be reduced to the behaviour of individuals: individual utility maximisation leads directly to 
social welfare maximisation by a process of aggregation. More holistic economic proponents of  laissez-faire, 
however, writers such as Hayek and Adam Smith, who also would like us to rely on the spontaneous interaction of 
self-seeking agents, recognise that macro-level rationality – or irrationality – may be emergent at the macro-level, 
and not reducible to the rationality of micro-level behaviour. They have proposed various ‘invisible hand’ 
mechanisms which can, in their view, be relied upon to ‘educe good from ill’. This is not to suggest that any of these 
writers were necessarily conscious of facing this choice, or of adopting these strategies. Rather I am suggesting that 
this taxonomy allows us retrospectively to make sense of what they have said and done in ways that other 
interpretations do not. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to extend this study to the case of Robert Malthus2. Speciﬁcally, my goal is to try 
to identify a rhetorical stance which we can plausibly associate with Malthus, and to investigate whether the 
previously worked out taxonomy of reductionism and holism makes any sense when applied to his writings on 
population. The focus of the paper will mainly be on the Essay on Population of 1798, and subsequent editions, and 
A Summary View of the Principle of Population of 1830. The latter is a revised version of an article on population 
Malthus wrote for the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. These are Malthus’s ﬁrst and last words on the 
topic of population. Following the usage introduced by Flew (1970, 13), the ﬁrst, anonymous, edition of the Essay on 
Population of 1798 is referred to in this paper as the First Essay, while the ﬁve subsequent editions of 1803, 1806, 
1807, 1817 and 1826 – essentially a new work – are referred to as the Second Essay. The First Essay and the 
Summary View are referred to in the Pelican Classics edition edited by Antony Flew (Malthus 1970). The version of 
the Second Essay used is the Everyman edition (Malthus 1958), actually a reprinting of the seventh – or ﬁrst 
posthumous – edition of the Essay. 
 
Like Smith and Hayek, like Friedman and Lucas, Malthus is a de- fender of “the present order of things” (Malthus 
1970, 68), and an advocate of dependence on spontaneous forces, “the natural and necessary order of  things” 
                                                             
1 This paper was presented at the annual conference of the Association for Heterodox Economics, Nottingham Trent 
University, July 2003, at the UK History of Economic Thought conference, University of Leeds, September 2003, and at the 
European Society for the History of Economic Thought annual conference, University of Stirling, June 2005; I am grateful to 
participants and to Mary Denis, William Dixon and Geoﬀ Harcourt for their comments and support. I am particularly grateful 
to two referees for this journal for their meticulous scholarly criticism of two earlier drafts. 
2 Thomas Robert Malthus, like John Maynard Keynes, was always known by his middle name.  
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(Malthus 1808, 347). I suggest that we may read Malthus, like those laissez-faire economist just mentioned, as facing 
a choice of rhetorical strategy: of adopting either reductionism, or holism plus an invisible hand mechanism. The 
argument of the paper is that we may plausibly read Malthus as starting out within the eighteenth-century 
providentialist paradigm epitomised by Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart, but then, around the turn of the nineteenth 
century, as abandoning providentialism and adopting a more reductionist rhetorical strategy. Like Smith and Stewart, 
he takes a political stance that opposes fundamental reform of society. But in taking on the arguments of the leading 
radicals of the day, the English Jacobin and anarchist Godwin, and Condorcet, secretary of the French Legislative 
Assembly following the Revolution, he is drawn by the logic of his argument to a position very far removed from 
Smith’s stoic optimism. The weapon he deploys against these Jacobins is the principle of population, by means of 
which he is able to portray the present state of society as something natural, eternal and inevitable, something in 
common with the animal and vegetable kingdoms. The weapon is extremely potent against the ideological enemy, 
but causes considerable collateral damage to the providentialism which had hitherto been deployed in defence of 
the status quo. In the First Essay he tries to mitigate this by presenting a theodicy to reconcile his theory with a 
version of providentialism, but the result is not a providentialism acceptable to contemporary thought: it is 
heterodox, and within weeks of publication he begins work on its replacement. In subsequent editions of the Essay 
the relevant chapters are excised. Their place is taken by a secular and reductionist argument that unaided individual 
self-interest can guide us to socially desirable outcomes. 
 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to apply the methodology already developed elsewhere to Malthus’s work 
on population, and, in particular, to show that Malthus may be interpreted as shifting from a holistic to a 
reductionist rhetorical strategy, between the ﬁrst and subsequent editions of his Essay on Population. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section sketches the ‘two rhetorical strategies’ apparatus 
developed in previous papers. The third section shows that we may plausibly associate with Malthus a rhetorical 
project of the defence of the established order. The fourth section examines his original heterodox theodicy of 1798. 
The ﬁfth section looks at the link between the micro and the macro in Malthus’s works on population from 1803 
onwards, the link which we may see as replacing the theodicy of 1798. The new link is moral restraint, which, 
Malthus argues, is in the interest both of the individual and of the collectivity. The ﬁnal section concludes. 
 
2. The two rhetorical strategies of laissez-faire 
This section sketches the view developed in previous publications, that proponents of a policy prescriptions of 
laissez-faire may be understood as being compelled, to the extent that they are confronted with ontological issues, 
to make a choice between reductionism and holism, and, if they choose the latter, to attach to it an invisible hand 
mechanism, to underpin the reductionist policy prescription of laissez-faire. 
 
The research project of which this paper forms part is summarised in Denis (2004), and set out more extensively in 
Denis (2001). I have tried to show two things: Firstly, that in a world of partially overlapping and partially conﬂicting 
interests there is good reason to doubt that self-seeking agent behaviour at the micro-level will spontaneously lead 
to desirable social outcomes at the macro-level. The presence of externalities and prisoners’ dilemmas (formally the 
same thing), in such a world, imply that Nash equilibria cannot be assumed to be socially desirable outcomes, even in 
the minimal sense of Pareto efﬁciency. And, secondly, that we can usefully distinguish between two kinds of 
argument for laissez-faire. Reductionist laissez-faire writers argue that important aspects of the society we live in can 
straightforwardly be reduced to the behaviour of individuals: individual utility maximisation leads to social welfare 
maximisation by a process of aggregation. Apparent macro-level irrationality, such as unemployment, can thus be 
reduced to micro-level decisions on the trade oﬀ between leisure and labour. This is the well-known stance of 
Friedman and Lucas. 
 
There are, however, more holistic economic proponents of laissez- faire, writers who also would like us to rely on the 
spontaneous inter- action of self-seeking agents, but who recognise that social or collective rationality, or 
irrationality, may be emergent at the macro-level, and not reducible to the rationality, or otherwise, of substrate-
level behaviour giving rise to it. In order then to present the macro-level outcomes as desirable, they have proposed 
various ‘invisible hand’ mechanisms which can, in their view, be relied upon to ‘educe good from ill’. Smith, I argued, 
defended the ‘simple system of natural liberty’ as giving the greatest scope to the unfolding of God’s will and the 
working out of ‘natural’, providential processes, free of interference by ‘artiﬁcial’ state intervention – the expression 
not of divine order but of fallible human reason. Hayek, adopting a similar policy stance, based it in an evolutionary 
process in which those institutional forms best adapted to reconciling individual agents’ interests would, he believed, 
spontaneously be selected for in the inter-group struggle for survival. 
 
The alternative to both of these approaches is to combine Smith’s and Hayek’s recognition of the holistic nature of 
the world we live in with rejection of their postulate of an invisible-hand mechanism. In this view, rational self-
seeking behaviour on the part of individual agents is by no means either the necessary or the suﬃcient micro 
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substrate for the desirability of social outcomes. Rather, behaviour must be directly social if desirable social 
outcomes are to be obtained. According to Keynes, e.g., egotistical activity uncoordinated by the State may lead to 
ineﬃcient outcomes. The price system aggregates rational individual actions but the aggregate is an unintended out- 
come as far as those individuals are concerned. There is no particular reason why unintended outcomes should 
necessarily be desirable and often they are not. Individuals take responsibility for maximising their own welfare, 
given what everyone else is doing, but society as a whole has to take responsibility for organising the aggregate out- 
come if undesirable aggregate outcomes are to be avoided: “there is no design but our own ... the invisible hand is 
merely our own bleed- ing feet moving through pain and loss to an uncertain … destination” (Keynes 1981, 474). 
 
Marx, on the other hand, takes the argument a stage further by arguing, on the contrary, that there is, indeed, a 
design which is not our own, a design without a designer. Like Hayek, Marx believes this design to be ‘emergent’ at 
the macro level, but for Marx, unlike Hayek, because it is not our own design, it is alien to us. In the absence of 
directly social activity, atomistic behaviour spontaneously arranges it- self into a self-augmenting parasitic network 
of social relations which he calls ‘capital’. A society of individual humans thus becomes dominated by an interest 
alien to that of the individuals comprising it. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to extend this study to the case of Malthus. We therefore need to investigate 
the policy goals, the over-arching social philosophy, and the rhetorical approach for sustaining a desired prescription 
which we may plausibly associate with Malthus. 
 
A caveat is in order. I focus exclusively on the issue I start out with – the choice which I argue faces political 
economists between a reductionist and a holistic methodology, and the necessity which I further argue faces 
proponents of a laissez-faire policy prescription who adopt a holistic methodology, to supplement it with an invisible-
hand mechanism. That is what the paper and the research project of which it is a part is about. But that by no means 
implies that this is a necessary and suﬃcient explanation of the entire history of economic thought! Very much more 
is going on. No political economist remains wholly consistent throughout his life: to do so would imply either that he 
knew everything to start with, or that he was incapable of learning. Adam Smith is an instance of an economist 
displaying an exceptional degree of consistency, yet he changes tack, contradicts himself, shifts emphasis and learns. 
No single bipolar taxonomy can hope to explain the intricacy of the actual development. Malthus, I believe, displays 
greater changes in standpoint than Smith on key issues. My claim is that the framework adopted here may be an 
enlightening way of looking at these changes, not that it displaces other undoubtedly valid interpretative stances, or is 
uniquely right, or that it explains everything. 
 
3. Malthus’s project in the works on population 
This section examines the evidence for a rhetorical project on Malthus’s part and argues that, as in the cases of  
Smith and Hayek (Denis 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005), that he may be reasonably ascribed a rhetorical project of 
defence of the established order against Jacobin and utopian plans for revolutionising the social institutional 
structure. 
 
The full title of Malthus’s Essay of 1798, is “An essay on the principle of population, as it aﬀects the future 
improvement of society with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers.” The 
preface starts by pointing out that the Essay was prompted by a conversation with “a friend” – actually, his father – 
on Godwin’s essay of 1797 on “Avarice and Profusion”. His father, Daniel Malthus, was an enthusiastic participant in 
the eighteenth-century enlightenment, a friend of both Hume and Rousseau, both of whom visited the family before 
Robert was a month old. Daniel was particularly inﬂuenced by the more left-leaning amongst les philosophes, such as 
Condorcet and Godwin, who contrasted the existing order with various utopias founded on equality, and the 
abolition of marriage, private property and the state. Robert Malthus’s Essay is explicitly couched as a contribution 
to the debate between these Jacobins, on the one hand, and supporters of the institutional status quo, on the other, 
and equally explicitly takes the side of the latter. 
 
Malthus’s argument is that the “perfectibility of society”, the image of a future society without misery, is a chimera: 
“To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas! beyond the power of man” (Malthus 1970, 102). It is not institutions, 
such as property and inequality, which cause this misery, but ineluctable natural laws, in particular, the laws of 
population. Malthus identiﬁes two conﬂicting forces: ﬁrstly, the tendency of population, unchecked, to increase in a 
geometrical progression. This is both true and profound, and Malthus deserves credit for clearly articulating this 
insight, notwithstanding its prior suggestion by both Wallace and Franklin, neither of whom realised its signiﬁcance. 
The other, according to Malthus, is the – at best – arithmetical rate of increase of the production of the means of 
subsistence. This assertion is of quite diﬀerent status. Despite everything Malthus says on the topic, there is no 
reason in principle why the production of the necessaries of subsistence should not grow geometrically. 
 
Given this proposed disparity between the two rates of growth, something has to give. The actual rate of growth of 
population can- not exceed the rate of growth of the supply of the necessities of subsistence. The important 
question is, how the potentially geometrical unchecked rate of growth of population is brought down to what it is 
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possible for the earth to sustain, what indeed are the checks on population? Malthus’s answer in the First Essay is 
diﬀerent in an important detail from that in subsequent editions. But the basic pattern remains. There are two kinds 
of checks: preventive and positive, aﬀecting the birth and death rates respectively (Flew 970, 44). Alongside this 
positive classiﬁcation Malthus proposes a normative one. It is here that the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and 
subsequent editions is manifest: in the former, the normative classiﬁcation of checks on population is into vice and 
misery, in the latter an additional category of “moral restraint” is introduced. There is a strong, though imperfect, 
correlation between vice and preventive checks – both include prostitution, abortion and contraception, and another 
between misery and positive checks – war, disease and famine are examples of both. Moral restraint, however, is an 
instance – indeed, the only one – of a preventive check which is not vicious. It is also the case that, unlike the 
categories of positive and preventive checks, those of misery and vice are not mutually exclusive: war, e.g., is both 
vicious in its practice, and miserable in its consequences (Malthus 1970, 85). 
 
The message of the First Essay, therefore, is that a state of misery and vice – misery certainly, and vice very probably 
– is the inevitable consequence of human nature. Naturally, as an Anglican parson, Malthus deplores vice and would 
much prefer misery, but that it immaterial. The point is that we cannot avoid misery, except perhaps by vice (which 
in any case, as in the cases of war or the exposure of children, e.g., is itself likely merely to change the form of 
misery): 
the race of man cannot, by any eﬀorts of reason, escape from [Necessity, that imperious, all pervading law of 
nature]. Among plants and animals its eﬀects are waste of seed, sickness, and premature death. Among 
mankind, misery and vice. The former, misery, is an absolutely necessary consequence of it. Vice is a highly 
probable con- sequence, and we therefore see it abundantly prevail, but it ought not, perhaps, to be called an 
absolutely necessary consequence. The ordeal of virtue is to resist all temptation to evil.  (Malthus 1798, 72) 
Checks to population are an inevitable and permanent feature of our lives, and all are “fairly resolved into misery 
and vice” (Malthus 1970, 103, 106). Attempts to remove the condition of misery by institutional change, as 
advocated by utopians and radical reformers, are therefore doomed. 
 
Repeatedly, throughout the Essay, Malthus returns to this central point: the laws of population mean that misery is 
unavoidable, and institutional change is powerless to aﬀect it. Though he concedes that the behaviour of some 
elements of society can mitigate or exacerbate the evils he identiﬁes, he emphasises that it cannot remove them. 
Concluding the ﬁrst and second chapters respectively, he writes: 
This natural inequality of the two powers of population and of production in the earth, and that great law of 
our nature which must constantly keep their eﬀects equal, form the great diﬃculty that to me appears 
insurmountable in the way to the perfectibility of society … I see no way by which man can escape from the 
weight of this law which pervades all animated nature. No fancied equality, no agrarian regulations in their 
utmost extent, could remove the pressure of it.  (Malthus 1970, 72) 
[T]hough the rich by unfair combinations contribute frequently to prolong a season of distress among the 
poor, yet no possible form of society could prevent the almost constant action of misery upon a great part of 
mankind, if in a state of inequality, and upon all, if all were equal.  (Malthus 1970, 79) 
In chapter V Malthus presents the argument that transferring purchasing power from the rich to the poor will not 
help the latter, and, in particular, that the Poor Laws should be abolished. The taxes and beneﬁts involved in 
redistribution might reallocate wealth, but would not change the fact of poverty: “The rich might become poor, and 
some of the poor rich, but a part of the society must necessarily feel a diﬃculty of living, and this diﬃculty will 
naturally fall on the least fortunate members” (Malthus 1970, 95-96). 
 
An escape route from this dreary fate appears in the Second Essay, however. In addition to misery and vice, a critical 
third category of ‘moral restraint’ is introduced. Moral restraint has a very speciﬁc meaning. It does not mean 
restraint from sexual intercourse, and certainly not contraception, which Malthus abhorred as vice. What it meant 
was marrying later and with lower probability. To postpone or to refrain altogether from marriage was to practice 
moral restraint. Both of these would lower the birth rate and – nota bene – they were the only non-vicious method 
of doing so. Monogamy was assumed throughout – “violations of the marriage bed” he naturally condemned as vice. 
 
This diﬀerence between the earlier and later versions of the Essay is critical and lies at the heart of this paper: the 
contrast between these two visions constitutes the focus, indeed, of the rest of the pa- per. The earlier version 
presents us with an extremely gloomy view of the world. So gloomy, indeed, that Malthus was driven to write an 
extensive theodicy constituting the last two chapters, about one eleventh of the Essay, reconciling his ﬁndings with 
the existence of a benevolent and providential deity. In the later version, however, individuals can opt for moral 
restraint, and, to the extent that they do so, the actual rate of growth of population falls below that of production, 
leaving us all better oﬀ. Note that this escape route from the Scylla and Charybdis of misery and vice still does not 
imply a role for institutional change: it is individual behaviour which is key, and, as we shall see, the incentives are 
already in place to guide those individuals to socially desirable behaviours. Hence, again, the project is one of 
defence of the existing institutional order: institutional change in the direction of greater equality or of inroads into 
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property are not required: individual self-seeking behaviour leads directly into socially desirable social outcomes, 
without the necessity for collective action. 
 
This is not the place for a full discussion of the extent to which Malthus can be fairly described as a proponent of 
laissez-faire. Like Smith and Hayek, Malthus ﬁrmly believes that spontaneous, ‘natural’ forces were to be relied 
upon. But, also like them, he is prepared to concede that there may be exceptions, though he is never quite so 
conﬁdent about the exceptions as he is about the underlying principle: James writes of “Malthus’s uncomfortable 
belief that government interference might sometimes be necessary [though] he was never quite sure of  it himself” ( 
James 1979, 313). 
 
James (1979, 153-155) has an interesting discussion of Malthus’s attitude to poverty in Ireland during the population 
explosion which preceded the famines of the 1840s. His strong defaults for reliance on spontaneous processes and 
withdrawal of the State from intervention come out very clearly. The modern reader, she writes, will ﬁnd it diﬃcult 
to follow Malthus’s “laissez-faire approach to the economic situation” ( James 1979, 153), and his advocacy of  
abandonment of  the children of  the imprudent to “the punishment of  nature” ( James 1979, 313). 
 
Malthus does indeed call for legislative activity, but its direction is generally towards the curtailment of non-market 
forces, and render- ing more uniform their burden: so he calls for tithes and rates to be both reduced and 
regularised ( James 1979, 155; Malthus 1808, 346), that is, he wants signiﬁcantly lighter and much more uniform 
taxes. But rents are another matter: they arise from market forces, and are therefore sacrosanct: “every eﬀort 
should be used to relieve the people from the pressure of tithes … but that any man of common sense should [wish 
to relieve them from] rents is inconceivable”. On closer analysis of rents, he is happy for legislation to regulate rents 
in kind, which are not a product of the market system, but a hangover from the past, but, he says, we cannot prevent 
“the natural rise of pecuniary rents which takes place from the principles of free competition in the progress of  
wealth and population” (Malthus 1808, 346). A “continued rise of rents is in the natural and necessary order of 
things, to clamour against it is folly – to interfere in it would be madness” (Malthus 1808, 347). 
 
Malthus takes a similar line on wages. Where falling wage levels are caused by the market forces of the demand for 
and supply of labour, they are beyond the power of the Legislature to relieve. However, the cause of low wages for 
the Catholic majority in Ireland was the political discrimination against them on religious grounds. Here the State had 
a real responsibility to put things to rights: “the ﬁrst step … must be the full and complete emancipation of the 
Catholics … to begin with the ignorance and poverty, is manifestly to begin at the wrong end, and to labour in vain” 
(Malthus 1808, 353-354). 
 
It is the case that Malthus supported, albeit reluctantly and uncertainly, State regulation of trade in foodstuﬀs. A full 
discussion is outwith the scope of this paper3. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that, like Hayek (1988, 20), who 
argues that intervention may be necessary “if for no other reason, because there has so often been coercive 
interference” in the past, Malthus, too, predicates intervention on the suboptimalities induced by previous 
intervention. State regulation, he says, was called for by the imbalance between urban and rural production, an 
imbalance which would not have arisen had things been allowed to follow their natural course: 
but the high proﬁts of commerce from monopolies, and other peculiar encouragements, have altered this 
natural course of things, and the body politick is in an artiﬁcial, and in some degree diseased state, with one 
of its principal members [ie agriculture] out of proportion to the rest.  (Malthus 1803, 449-450) 
By “monopolies” Malthus means legal monopolies granted by the crown, not the spontaneous emergence of market-
dominating ﬁrms from the process of competition – a much later conception. Commerce and industry had been 
encouraged by grants of monopoly and subsidies – “peculiar encouragements” – to the detriment of agriculture, he 
felt, and therefore protection of the latter in the form of the corn laws, had some merit in his view, as a measure to 
mitigate the evils of past intervention. 
 
My judgement, then, is that while Malthus, like Smith and Hayek, was prepared to endorse exceptions to the rule of 
laissez-faire, his loyalty to the principle was on a level with theirs, and it does him no injustice to place him, with 
them, in the category of advocates of laissez-faire. 
 
4 Malthus’s heterodox theodicy 
This section examines Malthus’s original theodicy of 1798, compared with the general providentialism of the time, as 
evidenced, e.g., in Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart. 
 
Adam Smith thought the world a great machine, supervised by an omnipotent, omniscient and beneﬁcent deity, with 
                                                             




the sole aim of the maximisation of  happiness: 
all the inhabitants of the universe, the meanest as well as the greatest, are under the immediate care and 
protection of that great, benevolent, and all-wise being, who directs all the movements of nature; and who is 
determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to maintain in it, at all times, the greatest possible quantity 
of happiness.  (Smith 1976a, VI.ii.3.1) 
[T]hat divine Being[’s] ... benevolence and wisdom have, from all eternity, contrived and conducted the 
immense machine of the universe, so as at all times to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness.  
(Smith 1976a, VI.ii.3.5) 
So the world is perfect: we do live in the “best of all possible worlds” Smith is a true Panglossian. Since the world is 
really perfect, our apparent troubles stem from our ﬁnite, partial view of the world. In contrast to the inﬁnite mind of 
God, our ﬁnite minds fail to discern “all the connexions and dependencies of  things” (Smith 1976a, VI.ii.3.3). All the 
imperfections of man are given us with good reason by a wise providence and by acting in what may seem to us an 
imperfect way, we fulﬁl the divine plan. We follow the dictates of self-love in our economic activity, while the invisible 
hand of the Deity ensures that the social outcomes are consistent with maximising human happiness. The policy 
prescription is “the obvious and simple system of  natural liberty” (Smith 1976b, IV.ix.5), which will give the greatest 
scope to the working out of the Deity’s intentions for us. 
 
Dugald Stewart emphatically shares this standpoint, consciously echoing Smith’s pronouncements. “In every state of 
society which has yet existed”, he writes, “the political order … is chieﬂy the result of the wisdom of nature”.  
 
The motivations of each individual act in subserviency to [nature’s] designs, and … conduct him … to certain 
beneﬁcial arrangements … he is led by an invisible hand, and contributes his share to the execution of a plan, 
of the nature and advantages of which he has no conception.  (Stewart 1842, 144) 
A ﬁrm conviction that the general laws of the moral, as well as of the material world, are wisely and 
beneﬁcently ordered for the welfare of our species, inspires the pleas- ing and animating persuasion, that by 
studying these laws, and accommodating to them our political institutions, we may … [consider] ourselves … 
as fellow-workers with God in forwarding the gracious purposes of his government. It represents to us the 
order of society as much more the result of Divine than of human wisdom; the imperfections of this order as 
the eﬀects of our own ignorance and blindness.  (Stewart 1854, 491-492) 
For Stewart this standpoint had immediate policy implications, as in- deed it had for Smith. Taking up a matter close 
to Malthus’s heart, Stewart raises the rhetorical question 
whether the existing system of our poor laws may not be added to the many other in- stances which human 
aﬀairs aﬀord, of an oﬃcious attempt on the part of statesmen, to accomplish artiﬁcially, by the wisdom of 
man, those beneﬁcent ends, for securing which so beautiful an arrangement has been made by the wisdom 
of Providence.  (Stewart, 1855, 45-46) 
The standpoint of Smith and Stewart here is just the common currency of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. Malthus starts out entirely in this camp, referring to the Deity in the First Essay as “that Being who ﬁrst 
arranged the system of the universe, and for the advantage of his creatures, still executes, according to ﬁxed laws, all 
of  its various operations” (Malthus 1970, 70-71). As in Smith, the world is a machine tended by a Deity for the 
maximisation of human “advantage”. But the speciﬁc argument that Malthus uses to counter the utopians – the laws 
of population – places an intolerable strain on providentialism, forcing him to abandon it as the main rhetorical 
device for the defence of the status quo. This can be seen from the progress of Malthus’s theodicy between the ﬁrst 
(1798) and subsequent editions (1803 onwards) of the Essay on Population, and ﬁnally in the Summary View (1830). 
What we see is not so much changes in Malthus’s view on key points about the nature of the world that he is 
observing, as changes in strategy as to how those points are to be communicated to his audience. The “infamous 
theodicy” (Poovey 1998, 288)4 of the ﬁrst edition is the spoonful of sugar to help down the bitter medicine of the 
principle of population. In the subsequent editions, Malthus may be interpreted as choosing a wholly diﬀerent 
rhetorical strategy. The theodicy is abandoned, and in its place an argument, that self-interest alone, without 
external assistance, conduces to the general interest, is imported. 
 
Malthus sets out his theodicy in the last two chapters, chapters 18 and 19, of the First Essay. He opens chapter 18 
with the statement that 
The view of human life which results from the contemplation of the constant pressure of distress on man 
from the diﬃculty of subsistence, by shewing the little expectation that he can reasonably entertain of 
perfectibility on earth, seems strongly to point his hopes to the future … [W]hen … we turn our eyes to the 
book of nature … we see a constant succession of sentient beings, rising apparently from so many specks of 
matter, going through a long and sometimes painful process in this world, but many of them attaining, ere 
                                                             
4 Poovey also refers to “the heterodoxy of the last two chapters” (Poovey 1998, 290), prompting the title of this paper. 
For a detailed explanation of the diﬀerences between Malthus’s theodicy and orthodox Anglicanism, see Pullen 1981 
and Waterman 1991. 
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the termination of it, such high qualities and powers as seem to indicate their ﬁtness for some superior state.  
(Malthus 1970,  200-201) 
“The future” here means the next life, in contrast to “on earth”. So the hardship of this life has the beneﬁt or 
purpose of turning our attention to the afterlife. The diﬃculty of subsistence on this earth is justiﬁed by the fact that, 
via a long and sometimes painful process, it generates a succession of sentient beings ﬁt for the “superior state” of 
the next life. 
Inﬁnite power is so vast and incomprehensible an idea that the mind of man must necessarily be bewildered 
in the contemplation of it. With the crude and puerile conceptions which we sometimes form of this attribute 
of the Deity, we might imagine that God could call into being … existences, all free from pain and 
imperfection.  (Malthus 1970, 201) 
Like Smith, Malthus resorts to the standard argument of the contrast between the inﬁnite mind of God and the ﬁnite 
mind of man. Man, with his ﬁnite mind, might make the mistake of imagining that God had freedom to create worlds 
without suﬀering. But, as Smith says, the Deity may “admit into the system of his government, no partial evil which is 
not necessary for the universal good” (Smith 1976a, VI.ii.3.3); the evil and suﬀering we see must be logically 
necessary for the existence of the world. The reason we cannot see this is because of the limits of our ﬁnite minds. 
But the Deity is indeed constrained – it takes time and eﬀort to generate souls ﬁt for heaven: 
unless we wish to exalt the power of God at the expense of his goodness, ought we not to conclude that even 
to the great Creator, almighty as he is, a certain process may be necessary, a certain time (or at least what 
appears to us as time) may be requisite, in order to form beings with those exalted qualities of mind which 
will ﬁt them for his high purposes?  (Malthus 1970, 201) 
Downplaying the omnipotence of the Deity in this way exposed Malthus to the charge of Manichaeanism – of which 
he was accused by Ricardo and James Mill (Waterman 2002, 916). This is where the heterodoxy of Malthus’s 
theodicy lies. 
 
Pursuing this argument, Malthus is led to consider 
the world and this life as the mighty process of God … for the creation and formation of mind, a process 
necessary to awaken inert, chaotic matter into spirit, to sublimate the dust of the earth into soul, to elicit an 
ethereal spark from the clod of clay. And in this view of the subject, the various impressions and excitements 
which man receives through life may be considered as the forming hand of his Creator, acting by general 
laws, and awakening his sluggish existence, by the animating touches of the Divinity, into a capacity of 
superior enjoyment.  (Malthus 1970, 202) 
The law of population is precisely an instance of these excitements, speciﬁcally designed by Providence as a stimulus 
and implacable need to urge us on to fulﬁl its designs: 
To furnish the most unremitted excitements of this kind, and to urge man to further the gracious designs of 
Providence by the full cultivation of the earth, it has been ordained that population should increase much 
faster than food. This general law … undoubtedly produces much partial evil, but a little reﬂection may, 
perhaps, satisfy us, that it produces a great overbalance of good.  (Malthus 1970, 204-205) 
So this is the position in 1798. Man’s lot is one necessarily of misery, and, to the extent that he succumbs to 
temptation, of vice as well. But this is absolutely necessary for the execution of God’s plan. We therefore are assured 
that what seems an evil to our ﬁnite minds is in fact the most desirable possible outcome, the execution of the 
‘Supreme  Creator’s’ plans: 
Both reason and experience seem to indicate to us that the inﬁnite variety of nature (and variety cannot exist 
without inferior parts, or apparent blemishes) is admirably adapted to further the high purpose of the 
creation and to produce the greatest possible quantity of good.  (Malthus 1970, 212) 
This is in strong contrast to the conventional pious Anglican providentialism Malthus displays in his subsequent 
works. Only in the ﬁnal pages of the Summary View do we return to the issue of theodicy addressed in the last two 
chapters of the First Essay. But now the reconciliation with conventional Anglican religion is an afterthought, a 
footnote, a response to his critics. And its content has changed. In the First Essay he was at pains to point out that 
this life was not a ‘trial’, as, ﬁrstly, God would have no need to try souls, since it would imply that he did not know, 
prior to the trial, what the outcome would be, thus contradicting the omniscience of the Deity, and, secondly, if this 
life is to try souls, then those souls must have been produced, and, nota bene, with a variable quality, in some other, 
prior arena. 
 
In the Summary View, however, he makes no attempt to resurrect his critique of the probatory nature of this life, 
accepting now that “both the letter and spirit of revelation represent this world as a state of moral discipline and 
probation … the principle of population, in- stead of being inconsistent with revelation, must be considered as 
aﬀording strong additional proofs of its truth”. So the world now is indeed a trial or ‘state of probation’. His claim 
now is that the law of population tries us more eﬀectively than any other natural force: 
in the whole range of the laws of nature, not one can be pointed out which so especially accords with this 
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scriptural view of the state of man on earth; as it gives rise to a greater variety of situations and exertions 
than any other, and marks, in a more general and stronger manner … the diﬀerent eﬀects of virtue and vice, – 
of the proper government of the passions, – and the culpable indulgence of them.  (Malthus 1970, 272) 
Whereas the theodicy of the First Essay was unrelievedly gloomy, with misery an absolute necessity, and designedly 
so, in order to produce souls of the requisite quality to share eternity with their creator, this life in the Summary 
View has become a test leading to happiness for those that pass it: 
in a state of probation, those laws seem best to accord with the views of a benevolent Creator which, while 
they furnish the diﬃculties and temptations which form the essence of such a state, are of such a nature as to 
reward those who overcome them, with happiness in this life as well as in the next. But the law of population 
answers particularly to this description.  (Malthus 1970, 272) 
 
5. Individual action and social outcome from the Second Essay onwards 
This section looks at the link from the micro to the macro in the Second Essay and the Summary View, the link which 
replaces the theodicy of 1798. That link is moral restraint, which, Malthus argues, is in the interest both of the 
individual, and the society. 
 
For Smith, theology was at the core of his world view, of the enticing picture he painted, the “entertaining romance” 
that he wrote (Smith 1983, ii.134), to reconcile us to our world and to inspire us to act in harmony with the laws of 
Nature and Nature’s God (Becker 1932, 63). For Malthus, it seems, post 803, theology has become some- thing 
external, something detachable and disposable. Smith adopts a holistic standpoint: order is emergent; socially 
desirable outcomes would not necessarily issue from self-seeking behaviour, but for the intervention of a kindly 
deity, exempting us from the necessity of our own intervention. But if with the turn of the nineteenth century 
theology has become peripheral for Malthus’s rhetorical strategy,5 then what, if anything, can he claim will 
guarantee the desirability of the social outcomes of spontaneous self-seeking behaviour? If nothing, then there is the 
case for radical social surgery presented, if not yet by Marx and Keynes, at least by Condorcet and Godwin. Holism 
plus an invisible hand underpins the reductionist policy prescription of laissez-faire. Dropping the rhetorical device of 
the invisible hand threatens to lead to the abandonment of laissez-faire. The suggestion of this paper is that the 
alternative to a holistic rhetorical strategy with an invisible-hand mechanism, is a reductionist strategy: a laissez-faire 
policy prescription can be sustained in the absence of an in- visible-hand mechanism by simultaneously switching 
from a holistic to a reductionistic ontology. There is no need to suppose the existence of an invisible hand if one’s 
methodological standpoint is that of reductionism. Social welfare is then just the aggregate outcome of individual 
self-seeking activity. 
 
The speciﬁc self-seeking behaviour he has in mind is ‘moral restraint’: 
Moral restraint … may be deﬁned to be, abstinence from marriage, either for a time or permanently, from 
prudential considerations, with a strictly moral conduct towards the [female] sex in the interval. And this is 
the only mode of keeping population on a level with the means of subsistence which is perfectly consistent 
with virtue and happiness. All other checks, whether of the preventive or the positive kind, though they may 
vary greatly in degree, resolve themselves into some form of vice or misery.  (Malthus 1970, 250) 
Malthus considers the role of moral restraint at length in the Second Essay. First he sets the scene by discussing what 
virtue is in general: 
Our virtue … as reasonable beings, evidently consists in educing from the general materials which the Creator 
has placed under our guidance, the greatest sum of hu- man happiness; and as natural impulses are 
abstractedly considered good, and only to be distinguished by their consequences, a strict attention to these 
consequences and the regulation of our conduct conformably to them, must be considered as our principal 
duty.  (Malthus 1958, II, 157) 
Turning speciﬁcally to the question of prudence, that is, of delaying marriage until one is able to support the 
resulting family, he says 
There are perhaps few actions that tend so directly to diminish the general happiness as to marry without the 
means of supporting children. He who commits this act, therefore, clearly oﬀends against the will of God; and 
having become a burden on the society in which he lives, and plunged himself and family into a situation in 
which virtuous habits are preserved with more diﬃculty than in any other, he appears to have violated his 
duty to his neighbours and to himself, and thus to have listened to the voice of passion in opposition to his 
higher obligations.  (Malthus 1958, II, 166) 
So the general interest is clear: individuals should exercise moral restraint and postpone or abstain from marriage. 
But for Malthus, when we adopt moral restraint, we act, not merely in the general interest, but equally in our own 
                                                             
5 Though not, of course, for Malthus, the man, whose piety remained undimmed through- out his life. Waterman 




interests: by acting in our own best interests we thereby automatically act in the social interest: 
it is in the power of each individual to avoid all the evil consequences to himself and society resulting from 
the principle of population by the practice of a virtue clearly dictated to him by the light of nature … the 
exercise of this virtue to a certain degree would tend rather to increase than diminish individual happiness … 
the Deity[’s] general laws make this virtue necessary and punish our oﬀences against it by the evils attendant 
upon vice, and the pains that accompany the various forms of premature death … It is the apparent object of 
the Creator to deter us from vice by the pains which accompany it, and to lead us to virtue by the happiness 
that it produces.  (Malthus 1958, II, 166-167) 
The same point is made in the ﬁnal two sentences of the Summary View: 
Each individual has, to a great degree, the power of avoiding the evil consequences to himself and society 
resulting from [the law of population], by the practice of a virtue dictated to him by the light of nature, and 
sanctioned by revealed religion. And, as there can be no question that this virtue tends greatly to improve the 
condition, and increase the comforts both of the individuals who practise it, and through them, of the whole 
society, the ways of God to man with regard to this great law are completely vindicated.  (Malthus 1970, 272) 
So the Deity has set things up so that the individual is rewarded or punished for his actions according to their 
contribution to “promoting or diminishing the general happiness”. Note that individual behaviour only has an eﬀect 
on social outcomes via its eﬀect on the individual in question – there are no direct or spillover eﬀects: “virtue tends 
greatly to improve the condition … of the [virtuous] individuals … and through them, of the whole society”. 
 
These passages, however, are summaries and concluding passages; they are therefore quite allusive and could be 
neglected as obiter dicta. It is therefore worth spelling out in greater detail how Malthus links individual and social 
interests with respect to population. In the Second Essay he spends a chapter, chapter iv of book iv, describing the 
happy scene, should moral restraint ever be generally adopted. In the subsequent chapter he is wisely concerned to 
dispel the perception that this was as utopian as any writings of a Condorcet or a Godwin. Of the “improved state of 
society, which I have supposed in the last chapter”, he writes, 
The improvement there supposed … is to be eﬀected … by a direct application to the interest and happiness 
of each individual. It is not required of us to act from motives to which we are unaccustomed; to pursue a 
general good which we may not distinctly comprehend, or the eﬀect of which may be weakened by distance 
and diﬀusion. The happiness of the whole is to be the result of the happiness of individuals, and to begin ﬁrst 
with them. No co-operation is required. Every step tells. He who performs his duty faithfully will reap the full 
fruits of it, whatever may be the number of others who fail. This duty is intelligible to the humblest capacity. 
It is merely that he is not to bring beings into the world for whom he cannot ﬁnd the means of support … It is 
clearly his interest and will tend greatly to promote his happiness, to defer marrying till by industry and 
economy he is in a capacity to sup- port the children that he may reasonably expect from his marriage; and … 
considerations of his own interest and happiness will dictate to him the strong obligation to a moral conduct 
while he remains unmarried.  (Malthus 1958, II, 169) 
So social welfare is just the aggregate of individual levels of utility. The whole is just the sum of the parts. This is very 
much the line taken by Friedman and Lucas, and it has exactly the same policy implications. Where Lucas (1987, 54) 
argues that unemployment must be just the aggregate of all the individual decisions allocating time to labour and 
leisure, and therefore there can be no scope for State intervention, Malthus can blame poverty on the decisions of 
the poor, with a similar policy prescription. While Lucas has a theory of voluntary unemployment, Malthus has one of 
voluntary poverty: the parallel is exact. Of a man driven into poverty by conceiving too many children Malthus 
writes: 
In searching for objects of accusation, he never adverts to the quarter from which his misfortunes originate. 
The last person he would think of accusing is himself, on whom in fact the principal blame lies … the common 
people … are themselves the cause of their own poverty … the means of redress are in their own hands, and 
in the hands of no other persons whatever.  (Malthus 1958, II, 170) 
Interestingly, he was already developing this view within a few weeks of the publication of the First Essay; in a letter 
to Godwin in 1798 he writes that “The very admission [on Godwin’s part] of the necessity of prudence, to prevent 
the misery from an overcharged population, removes the blame from public institutions to the conduct of 
individuals” (Malthus 1798, 324). “Removing the blame” for misery from institutions was of paramount importance 
to Malthus. His ﬁrst at- tempt removes the blame from institutions to the Deity, his second attempt removed  the 
blame from institutions to individuals. 
 
In connection with a discussion of the Second Essay Santurri summarises Malthus’s policy prescription thus: 
For the most part the economic suﬀerings of the poor can be mitigated only by the poor themselves. Each 
individual must insure the fulfilment of his own basic needs by planning for the future. If he is not in a 
position to support a family, then he must refrain from marriage and remain continent. Society can provide 
its lower classes with no greater service than the cultivation and encouragement of such prudence …For 
Malthus the improvement of society, the achievement of the social good, depends only upon the individual 
10 
 
pursuit of self-interest, a pursuit which may be regarded as inevitable … insofar as people are egoists, the 
exercise of moral restraint is bound to prevail in the long run.  (Santurri 1982, 327-328) 
In adopting this reductionist standpoint, Malthus’s argument, like Lucas’s, must depend on assuming that there are 
no signiﬁcant externalities, prisoners’ dilemmas or free riders. This is made clear where he argues that the ‘full fruits’ 
of individual restraint are enjoyed by the individual practicing it, whatever anyone else is doing. As soon as the 
question is posed, the answer presents itself: such externalities sim- ply cannot be assumed away.6 Malthus claims, 
e.g., that “prudential restraint, if it were generally adopted, by narrowing the supply of labour in the market, would 
… soon raise its price … all abject poverty would be removed from society” (Malthus 1958, II, 161). But the beneﬁt to 
each individual, of the general increase in real wages caused by his own contribution to the practice of moral 
restraint, would be vanishingly small. Everyone else will practice moral restraint, or not, and he will beneﬁt, or not, 
according to what they do. His own inﬂuence on the outcome is negligible. So why should he contribute? We have a 
multi-player iterated prisoners’ dilemma: the cooperation move is to practice moral restraint, and the defection 
move is to marry early. The incentive structure leads individuals to defect. 
 
But for Malthus, virtue brings its own reward: we forward society’s interest in lowering the rate of reproduction by 
pursuing our own. This is a completely new argument which nowhere appears in the First Essay. No invisible hand is 
now necessary, as the good of society is just the sum of the condition and comfort of the individuals composing it. 
Since moral restraint is in the interest of the individual agent as much as of society, the best that the State can do to 
encourage it is to practise its own restraint and abstain from intervention. All that is required of the State is civil and 
political liberty and the defence of property. 
 
In the ﬁve years between 1798 and 1803 providentialism is quietly dropped (Malthus’s own list of changes between 
the two editions, in the Preface to the second edition (Malthus 1958, I, 1-3) fails to note the excision of the ﬁnal two 
chapters)7, and its place taken by moral restraint. 
 
It is a remarkable fact, given its centrality to the argument of the Second Essay and the Summary View, that 
prudential moral restraint was not in the First Essay, but ﬁrst introduced in the 1803 edition. Not only is the idea only 
introduced in the second edition, but it is in contradiction to the views expressed in the ﬁrst edition, in which he 
argues in favour of early marriage, stating baldly that “every obstacle in the way of marriage must undoubtedly be 
considered as a species of unhappiness” (Malthus 1970, 99), indeed “the dictate of nature and virtue seems to be an 
early attachment to one woman” (Malthus 1970, 73). While it is possible for individuals to foresee the adverse 
consequences of early marriage, and to abstain therefrom, he says, “this restraint almost necessarily … produces 
vice”, and in any case the attraction between the sexes is so powerful that no society, “even those that are most 
vicious”, can escape a tendency towards an increase in population causing distress to the lower  classes  (Malthus 
1970, 73). So at the level of the individual, restraint leads to vice, and at the aggregate level it doesn’t work. 
 
In spite of the apparently gloomy prognosis of permanent over- population in the First Essay, Malthus in the second 
and subsequent editions is able to propose a strong laissez-faire policy prescription. Human happiness is now 
assured, not in the afterlife by a beneﬁcent and powerful deity, but in the here-and-now by the self-seeking activity 
of individual agents in the context of a system of private property. Whereas in 1798 everything, including human 
suﬀering, conduced to the divine plan for man, showing that every ‘partial evil’ was only a necessary part of the 
universal good; now, in 1803 and thereafter, it is individual ‘virtue’ which will lead to progress in the condition and 
comfort of individuals, and, through them, of society at large. In moving from a holistic to a reductionist case for 
laissez-faire, we move from an essentially religious outlook to an essentially secular one: while providentialism 
makes no sense without a deity, the reductionist account of the mature Malthus, whatever his personal religious 
views, places the individual man, not his god, at the centre of the story. We know that Malthus remained a devout 
Christian to the end of his days. But we do not know what the religious outlook of Lucas – to whom I have compared 
Malthus in this paper – may be (indeed, it would be impertinent to ask). In both cases it is irrelevant to the political 
economy that they adopt. Before the watershed of 1800 religion and political economy are fused to the point that 




A central tenet of the Enlightenment was the notion of the perfectibility of humanity, the idea of progress. Taking up 
                                                             
6 It is precisely in this sense that Santurri (1982, 328-330) points to the irony of “an important lacuna in [Malthus’s] 
theodicy”, namely that “Until they are instructed, the poor will not understand that the exercise of prudence and 
foresight in the form of moral restraint is dictated by their own interests …Yet a system of public education is not 
generated naturally by individual pursuit of perceived self-interest”. 
7 In 1799 in a letter to the Monthly Magazine, Malthus announced that he would omit the ﬁnal two chapters in the 




this theme and developing it, utopian eighteenth-century writers such as Godwin and Condorcet, not only envisaged 
a goal, a time of plenty, but connected it with speciﬁc institutional changes, such as the abolition of private property. 
Malthus’s aim is expressly and explicitly to counter these utopian views by pointing up the principle of population. 
This principle means that the present level of suﬀering that we see about us at the turn of the nineteenth century 
will, substantially, always be with us. Whatever the growth in productive forces, and whatever the social 
arrangements we adopt to exploit those forces, we will always be crushed between two great tendencies: the 
arithmetical growth in the means of subsistence, and the geometrical growth in population. The only checks that 
Malthus can see, when he starts work on the topic in the 1790s, are vice and misery. Hence we are condemned to 
vice and misery forever and the prospect of “the future improvement of society” is a chimera. 
 
This paper has argued that we may read Malthus as going to considerable lengths to develop a theodicy, in which 
suﬀering and temptation are necessary parts of the Deity’s plan, and, in particular, are required to generate minds 
suitable to dwell with the Deity in the next life, in order to reconcile this gloomy picture with the standard 
providentialism of the day. This approach is entirely consistent in spirit with that taken by Smith and his biographer, 
Dugald Stew- art. The holism-plus-an-invisible-hand-mechanism approach looks at social life as a whole and portrays 
human happiness as something guaranteed – by a benign Deity (according to Smith), or a benign evolutionary 
process (Hayek). 
 
In the interpretation suggested in this paper, it was quickly apparent to the anonymous author, however, that this 
‘infamous’ theodicy would not do: providentialism was stretched to breaking point; within weeks he began work on 
an alternative rhetorical device, which would remove the blame for misery from institutions to individuals. 
Happiness was now possible in this life, not merely the next, and it was within the power of individuals to attain it. 
Each individual – to the extent that he is free, enlightened and self-respect- ing – may achieve happiness by following 
his own interest in moral restraint, regardless of the actions of others. Social welfare is just the aggregate of the 
beneﬁt each individual reaps from their own actions. Moving from the providential world of Smith and Stewart, we 
enter one where the desirability or otherwise of social outcomes can be safely ascribed to the self-interested 
behaviour of isolated individuals. Malthus’s reductionism makes the whole the sum of its parts, and once again, the 
scope for signiﬁcant collective action is denied. Both accounts are Panglossian, indeed: all is for the best in both – but 
there is a world of diﬀerence between the rhetorical strategies deployed in their service.  
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